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THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: POSSIBILITIES FOR
PROSECUTORIAL ABUSE
ALFRED P. RUBIN*
I
INTRODUCTION
So many problems are present in setting up an international criminal court
consistent with the current international legal, moral, and political orders, that one
must at least admire the intensity and dedication of those involved in the effort.  It
is tempting to conclude that the current international orders are simply not consis-
tent with the pattern of a world government that is implied in the notion of a
transnational criminal court administering “universal law” applicable to “universal
crimes.”  But the attempts to build a superstructure of legal governance on the ex-
isting system, using the tools of positive international law, have achieved a re-
markable degree of superficial success.  Thus, it seems appropriate to pause and
reconsider the situation.  On the face of it, the questions themselves are daunting.
Who should determine the content of any international criminal law?  How should
that determination be made?  When and to whom should it be applied, and what
institutional structure should govern?  It is far beyond the power of a single writer
to address all these issues in a short compass.1
A very large group of statesmen and scholars has attempted to grapple with
these issues.  The result is the Rome Statute for an International Criminal Court.2
To analyze that attempt definitively at this time is difficult, however, because the
statute itself is being expanded and supplemented in ways that substantially revise
it.  Nonetheless, some issues which seem to be ignored or underrated by those in-
volved in framing the Statute and its implementing regulations seem obvious to
those who have had to work with attempts in the past to systematize an hypothe-
sized international criminal law.3
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1. I tried to address the major theoretical issues in a book before the current proposals reached con-
crete form.  See ALFRED P. RUBIN, ETHICS AND AUTHORITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1997).
2. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U. N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998).
3. I was an Attorney-Adviser in the Department of Defense, principally responsible at the lower pro-
fessional levels in Washington for the Vietnam entanglements of the United States between 1963 and 1965.
In that capacity, I had to grapple with many of these problems.  I came away very much aware of the unwill-
ingness of the higher levels of government to consider the inconsistencies of grand policy based on Ameri-
can politics and various officials’ conceptions of morality with the imperatives of the law as it applied to in-
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II
AUTHORITY OF THE PROSECUTOR
One key aspect is the authority of the prosecutor to initiate the process of the
tribunal by charging particular individuals with violations of the law set out in the
statutethe supposed international criminal law.  As proposed, the discretion
given to the prosecutor is enormous.  Thus, the potential for abuse of that discre-
tion is also enormous; and reasonable people may disagree that the discretion will
always be exercised consistently with basic concepts of justice or the rule of law
supposedly implemented by the proposed institution.  Indeed, if the prosecutor is
to act at all, disputes about the conformity of the definitions of “international
crimes” with true international law must arise if an accused is to be able to defend
him or herself or, if the prosecutor does not act, identical questions must arise as
aggrieved victims of alleged atrocities question the failure of the institution to ad-
minister at least retributive justice against those alleged to have committed various
atrocities.4
A. Distribution of Authority under Prior Arrangements
Until the impetus for an international criminal court reached a degree of in-
tensity that made it politically impossible to stop, individual states had responsi-
bility for formulating appropriate criminal laws and applying appropriate criminal
sanctions.5  This resulted in various unworkable arrangements.  Under the Geno-
cide Convention of 1948, for example, only the state in which “genocide” occurred
has the responsibility to criminalize it or to submit accusations of genocide to an
international tribunal. 6  But the state in which the suspected atrocities occurred is
obviously the state least likely to accuse its own leaders of pursuing a villainous na-
tional policy while those leaders retain their authority under the municipal consti-
tutional law of that state.  If there had been a radical change in government in that
state, and the trial were part of a political vendetta against the former leaders, it is
questionable whether “justice” could be done because it is doubtful that exculpa-
dividual Americans.  For obvious reasons I did not feel free to publish a paper on those experiences while
still working for the government.  After leaving it, no publisher seemed interested in the paper I actually
wrote because the debate had moved far beyond the impressions of a junior official and the legal aspects of
it had become drowned in politics and rhetoric.  Aspects are the subject of a short study produced in 1972
for a Panel on Humanitarian Problems and International Law of the American Society of International
Law, finally published as Alfred P. Rubin, Is War Still Legal?, 1980 INDIAN Y.B. INT’L. AFF. 32-80.  Other
aspects of my own Vietnam experience have appeared as small parts of too many other articles to cite in
this place.
4. Problems with the possibility of irremediable abuses of prosecutorial discretion go to the essence of
the proposed system; in my view no amount of supplementation or expansion can limit the problems to an
acceptable level.  See discussion infra Part III.
5. I do not wish to point fingers, but it was notorious that one such political casualty was the United
States, which supported the proposal to establish such a court until various superficial dangers came to the
attention of those responsible for formulating the overall American position.  By then it was politically too
late.
6. THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: A COLLECTION OF CONVENTION RESOLUTIONS, AND
OTHER DOCUMENTS 231-49 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 3d rev. and completed ed. 1988).
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tory evidence would be made available.7  Similarly, if there had been a negotiated
change of government, then questions would arise over whether the viability of
amnesties and other legal arrangements agreeable to the parties directly involved
should be jeopardized by outsiders.
Such questions cannot be resolved by the application of strict rules, but involve
political calculations and evaluations, about which reasonable people are almost
certain to differ.  If the villains remain in control of the state in which the atrocities
occurred, then even if there were a positive law in that state forbidding the atroci-
ties, the accuseds would be unlikely to be convicted by a national tribunal in which
the judges or administrators were selected by a municipal process that also
brought to the top of its political ladder people who were capable of genocide.
Nor would the accuseds likely ever submit to any international judicial process ex-
cept as a way of having the foreigners dispose of embarrassing opposition leaders
who had already lost influence in local society.  In the Genocide Convention’s
fifty-two years of existence, there have been no national trials based on its terms.
The notion that states refusing to hold trials themselves would have handed their
former leaders over to international tribunals for trial seems unrealistic unless the
hand-over were to enable the foreigners to get rid of embarrassing political leaders
that a new government felt too weak to handle itself.  Not only is the scenario un-
likely but in reality it seems impossible.  A government so weak that it cannot run
its own trials is unlikely to be strong enough to arrest and extradite or otherwise
transfer its former leaders to an international tribunal.  If the theoretical possibility
exists, then the question must involve an evaluation of the moral, political, and fi-
nancial costs of implementing it when the likelihood of actual implementation
seems negligible.
The same weaknesses appear in the “war crimes” conceptions of general in-
ternational law and the “grave breaches” provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions.8  The “grave breaches” provisions provide the simplest example: Every party
is obliged to seek out for “trial persons accused of a grave breach” or hand such
villains over “for trial” to “another party concerned who can make out a prima fa-
cie case.”9  But if the arresting power cannot mount a proper case, and no other
7. As a general matter, it is questionable whether the international community should play any role at
all in matters affecting the constitution and governance of any independent body in the international legal
or political order.
8. “War crimes” trials of vanquished villains by victors have a number of precedents.  See the 1865
Henry Wirz (Andersonville) Trial, in 1 THE LAW OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 783 (Leon
Friedman ed., 1972), reprinted from 8 AMERICAN STATE TRIALS 666 ff. (1918).  The Nuremberg, Tokyo,
and other post-WWII tribunals seem also to be of this sort.  For the “grave breaches” provisions of the 1949
Geneva Conventions, see THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 6: Convention for the Ameliora-
tion of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, T.I.A.S.
No. 3362, arts. 49-50 at 391; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick,
and  Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, arts. 50-51, at
418; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, arts.
129-130, at 475-76; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, arts. 146-47, at 546-47.
9. The wording is identical in all four Conventions cited in note 8 above.  See Wounded and Sick
Convention art. 49 ¶ 2; Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Convention art. 50 ¶ 2; Prisoners of War
Convention art. 129 ¶ 2; and Civilians Convention art. 146 ¶ 2.
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“party concerned” is prepared to run a trial, nothing happens.  This has been the
fate of the 1949 Geneva Conventions for more than fifty years.  Since 1949 there
appear to have been no cases of trial or “hand . . . over” under any of their terms.
The reason has not been the lack of interest in third states; it has been in their lack
of authority.  They are not states “concerned” in a legal sense, and they cannot
make out a prima facie case regardless of their news media.
Now, the word “concerned” can be interpreted to mean merely “interested,”
but it has never been so interpreted except by lawyers who fancy themselves sit-
ting in judgment on the villainies perpetrated by foreign statesmen from time im-
memorial.  Indeed, the international law related to “standing” has a long and
complex history.10  By the behavior of states apparently pursued as a matter of law,
a need for “standing” seems to restrict international legal purview in “human
rights” cases. 11
But national criminal12 trials have indeed been held with regard to some atroci-
ties, and in a few cases “victors’ tribunals” have tried foreigners for violations of
the international laws of war.13  In most cases by far, the atrocities have been cate-
gorized in American precedents not as violations of international law, but as viola-
tions of the American law governing American military personnel.14  The reasons
why states have applied their own law to limit atrocities committed by their own
forces are fairly clear, and some of them were spelled out by the United States Su-
preme Court after the American Civil War of 1861-65.15  Among other things, ap-
plying the state’s own law helps maintain discipline in that state’s forces; limits the
10. See, e.g., the Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. Rep 4 (Apr. 6), in which a willing peti-
tioner state, Liechtenstein, was denied “standing” to pursue a human rights claim with regard to one of its
own nationals on the ground that the nationality link was not sufficiently grounded in the facts, although
there was no dispute that Nottebohm had been granted Liechtenstein nationality properly by the law of
Liechtenstein.  See also Barcelona Traction, Light, and Power Co., Ltd. Case (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J.
Rep. 3 (Feb. 5), and the disagreement among the judges as to whether the Nottebohm “genuine link” rule
applied to corporations.  Only the Belgian judge ad hoc dissented from the ruling that Belgium lacked
“standing” to bring a case against Spain for the injury to Belgian investors in a Canadian corporation.  See
id. at 357-85.
11. Cf. South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia and Liberia v. South Africa), Preliminary Objections, 1962
ICJ Rep. 319 (esp. dissenting opinions of Justices Spender and Fitzmaurice); Second Phase, 1966 ICJ Rep.
6 (majority opinion).
12. National civil trials for damages resulting from atrocities have indeed been held, but the usual
conflict of laws rules relating to jurisdiction, choice of law, and enforcement apply in those cases.  See Al-
fred P. Rubin, U.S. Tort Suits by Aliens Based on International Law, 18(2) FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 65-
75 (1994).  In criminal actions, some larger public policy is presumed to be involved, and the “plaintiff” is
the state or other public authority, not a private person.
13. See, e.g., United States v. Tomoyuki Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946) (U.S. Military Commission); see
also LAWRENCE TAYLOR, A TRIAL OF GENERALS 141-68 (1981).  In United States v. Capt. Ernest L.
Medina, the opposite result was reached when an American was the defendant before an American court
martial in a similar “command responsibility” case concerning the My Lai Massacre.  See THE LAW OF
WAR, supra note 8, at 1729.
14. See, e.g., the trial of General Jacob H. Smith (1902), in THE LAW OF WAR, supra note 8, at 794;
Lieutenant William L. Calley, in THE LAW OF WAR, supra note 8, at 1703; U.S. v. Captain Ernest L. Medina,
in THE LAW OF WAR, supra note 8, at 1729.
15. See, e.g., Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U.S. 176, 186-87 (1877) (“This concession [by the established gov-
ernment of belligerent rights to unrecognized belligerents, insurgents] is made in the interests of humanity,
to prevent the cruelties which would inevitably follow mutual reprisals and retaliations . . . upon the consid-
erations of justice, humanity and policy controlling the government.”).
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justification for reprisals by the enemy; eases the return to peace on reasonable
terms; and helps maintain a feeling of moral superiority and the political support
of both domestic and foreign constituency groups.  On the whole, these and per-
haps other reasons have made it in the interest of belligerents to deter the com-
mission of atrocities by their own forces, and, although occasionally belligerent
states have needed to be reminded of the political results of not enforcing their
own laws, the reminders have worked well.  It is self-defeating, demoralizing, and
disruptive of discipline to disregard the public reaction to the unpunished commis-
sion of atrocities by anybody.
B. Impetus for International Control
Yet some belligerents in some circumstances will ignore this longer-range in-
terest in order to achieve a shorter-term goal: ousting ethnic rivals from some bit
of territory, trying (normally unsuccessfully) to undermine the supposed will to re-
sist of enemy support groups.  Apparently it has been to supplement national en-
forcement that an international tribunal has now reached a point of major interna-
tional attention, not to remind belligerents of their own obligations or to punish
their failures, but to “rectify” the situation,16 to avoid injury to an interfering state
when other states fail to discharge their obligations.  However, even assuming that
some world authority can present itself as, or be understood by positive law to be,
a party “concerned” in a default that does not affect the well-being of the commu-
nity or of other states that are not sufficiently concerned to take action themselves,
and further assuming that the ancient rule “res inter alios acta” has been super-
seded, the question remains whether war or genocide or similar atrocities can be
supervised by an international body.  In my view, when people are willing to die
for a cause, send their children to die for it, and pay for the effort in supplies and
other ways, the notion that international supervision will limit atrocities is unreal-
istic in the absence of the full panoply of world government.
III
SERIOUS PROBLEMS WITH THE NEW PROPOSAL
These considerations surface as superficial problems.  Let us consider two of
those problems: First, the authority of the prosecutor to intervene without a full
investigation into allegations of atrocity; second, to allow an accused the op-
portunity to defend herself or himself.
A. Who Decides?
As to the first, under the Rome Statute, the prosecutor apparently is to have
the authority not only to initiate an investigation (and, in the usual civil law pat-
tern, to try to expose evidence as much to exculpate as to incriminate), but to ref-
16. “Rectification” is a word applied to a second state “concerned” doing for a defaulting state what
the defaulting state is otherwise legally bound to do itself.  See Jeffrey Sheehan, The Entebbe Raid . . . , 1(2)
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 135, 144-46 (1977); see also RUBIN, ETHICS, supra note 1, at 180 n.17.
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use to pursue an investigation in the interest of “justice.”  Under Article 15 of the
Rome Statute, he or she has the authority to initiate investigations proprio motu
on the basis of “information on crimes within the jurisdiction of the [c]ourt.”17
Where the prosecutor is to get that information or how he or she is to “analyze the
seriousness of the information received”18 are not spelled out.  Nor is there any
check on his or her judgment to determine “that there is a reasonable basis to pro-
ceed with an investigation.”19  Although no further action in the way of “investiga-
tion” seems legally permissible to the prosecutor without the approval of a pre-
trial chamber of the court, the refusal of the chamber to authorize a further inves-
tigation “shall not preclude the presentation of a subsequent request by the prose-
cutor based on new facts.”20  How he or she is to find the new facts without a con-
tinuing investigation is not clear, unless the word “investigation” carries some spe-
cially restricted meaning not clear from the actual text.  Apparently, the refusal of
the pre-trial chamber to authorize further investigation does not in fact preclude a
further investigation.  The normal reading is confirmed by a later article in which
the authority of the prosecutor alone to determine that there would be “a reason-
able basis to commence an investigation” or to “initiate an investigation” is
stated.21
The pre-trial chamber is composed of either one or three judges.22  Presuma-
bly, the prosecutor would search for a single judge whose views are similar to
those of the prosecutor in order to authorize further investigations, and political
calculations would be made by the prosecutor.  Aside from such limited judicial
review, there seems to be no other formal check on the prosecutor’s authority in
this regard.  Even if there were, some state or other entity with “standing” to ob-
ject to the prosecutor’s interpretation of his or her authority would have to be
found willing to suffer the ignominy of appearing to defend an accused from a se-
rious accusation of atrocity.  The likelihood that the prosecutor’s authority to
authorize such a further investigation would be limited in any significant way
seems negligible.
B. Decides What?
If formally acceptable, the authority of the prosecutor runs to genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes.23  I have serious doubts about the definitions of
each “crime” as contained in the statute.  More relevant to this article, I am con-
cerned about how such definitional imprecision will play out when the prosecutor
17. Rome Statute art. 15.1.
18. Id. art. 15.2.
19. Id. art. 15.3 (emphasis added).
20. Id. art. 15.5.
21. Id. art. 18.1.
22. See id. art. 39.2.b.iii.  Some argue that Article 57’s reference to “judges” in the plural somehow
overcomes this provision.  I have trouble accepting that argument and suggest that in the first instance the
question of interpretation is to be resolved either way by the prosecutor him- or herself and that the clear
language of Article 39.2.b.iii is much more likely to be persuasive of the parties’ intent than a gloss built
upon a single use of a plural in an ambiguous context.
23. Rome Statute art. 6 (genocide), art. 7 (crimes against humanity), art. 8 (war crimes).
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exercises his or her authority to determine whether the asserted “crimes” warrant
investigation.
First, genocide.  As noted above, states have not accepted the definitions in the
statute as definitions of any international law crime, but only as acts that states
themselves are legally bound to criminalize under their own municipal law.  To as-
sert now that the definition is sufficiently precise to serve as part of a criminal law
indictment is to construe beyond its obvious meaning the very limited approval
given by states in committing themselves to define the crimes and provide for their
punishment by their own law.  Nor has the gap been filled by customary interna-
tional law.  Except where there has been a positive delegation of definitional
authority to an international tribunal, there are no cases, therefore no “custom,”
to support the assertion.  This is not to say that “genocide,” however defined,
should be permitted; it is to say that the definition of the “crime” was deliberately
left to national legislators, and the Rome Statute does not provide the sort of
guidance the prosecutor or tribunal would need to define criminal acts worthy of
trial and punishment.  Then, to the extent that the prosecutor or tribunal is con-
strued to have the authority to define the essential elements of the crime of geno-
cide at international law, we would be reviving common law crimes.  Since judges
and the prosecutor are not representatives of the people who would be involved in
such crimes, either as victims or perpetrators, and are not subject to the demo-
cratic lawmaking processes or to removal for abuses of their discretion as seen by
others than a majority (in the case of judges, 2/3 majority) of the Assembly of
States Parties,24 this common law revival is deeply anti-democratic and reflects a
view of the world that has not worked since Plato proposed it about 2,370 years
ago.25  Further work has been done by states to redefine the essential elements of
the crime of genocide, but until the full and final text is published, it is impossible
to comment usefully on that effort.
As to crimes against humanity, the same problems exist, and worse.  For ex-
ample, one of the listed “crimes” is the “forcible displacement of the persons con-
cerned by expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in which they are lawfully
present, without grounds permitted under international law.”26  But what does
“lawfully” mean?  By what (or whose) “law” is it to be measured?  And who de-
cides whether the grounds alleged are “permitted under international law”?  The
crime of “apartheid” is supposedly defined as “inhumane acts . . . committed in the
context of an institutionalized regime of systemic oppression and domination by
one racial group over any other . . . .”27  Is the customary law caste system of India
24. See id. art. 46.
25. See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 263 (Desmond Lee trans., Penguin Classics revised ed. 1974)
(1955).  But Plato’s distinctions between the just and unjust person as ruler are too complex to be use-
fully summarized in this place.  To see how Plato’s approach was tried and failed during Plato’s lifetime,
see PLUTARCH, THE LIVES OF THE NOBLE GREEKS AND ROMANS 1155-86 (John Dryden trans., re-
vised by Arthur Hugh Clough, Modern Library no date) (“Life of Dion”); PLATO, COMPLETE WORKS
1646-67, 1667-71 (Glenn R. Morrow trans., John M. Cooper ed., 1977) (letters VII and VIII).
26. See Rome Statute art. 7.2.d (emphasis added).
27. See id. art. 7.2.h.
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included?  Or is the definition so restricted as to apply only to the former South
African regime?  Or is it a Palestinian position aimed at Israel?  Whatever the
proper interpretation, it seems to me that the authority of the prosecutor to inter-
pret is a tool of enormous power that has major political ramifications that have
not been fully considered.
As to war crimes, again the word “unlawfully”28 appears to have been taken
from the “grave breaches” provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions without
considering that those Conventions themselves are unclear and that these terms
have never been implemented.29  Indeed, there are so many overgeneralizations
and elisions in the specifications of war crimes that it is probably unnecessary to go
into detail.
The deeper problem with all of these purported definitions is that in the con-
ventions from which they are derived, the responsibility is deliberately placed
upon “states” to criminalize the horrid acts under their own law.  Now, if a state
fails to do that, it is in violation of its treaty commitments with the enforcement
policies that international law allows for violations of treaties.  To attach individual
criminal liability leaves the question as to whether the legislators who failed to en-
act the appropriate legislation are criminally liable, an unlikely conclusion.  Or are
the executive officials who acted according to the municipal law under which they
achieved authority to be liable for obeying that law which might permit (or even
compel) genocide or apartheid or other atrocities?  But since a tribunal might de-
termine the accusation to have been incorrect, the practical result is to permit a
third party to decapitate a state whose leader(s) might well be the product of a
democratic process, or to decapitate an army in the midst of a battle.  The result of
such a decapitation might well be to force a “just cause” to lose a war on the basis
of a single atrocity purportedly authorized by a single general—and the general
might even later be found not guilty of having ordered the atrocity.  But if the
prosecutor is authorized to withhold an arrest order on the basis of his or her
evaluation of the justice of the cause for which the accused is fighting, then consid-
erations of the jus ad bellum will be inserted in questions of the jus in bello against
centuries of logic and experience.30  And the judgment of the prosecutor alone
seems a very poor basis for a procedure that can have such sweeping (and deadly)
results.  I find it difficult to reconcile that result with the current legal order under
which there is no world government and no prospect of a neutral arbiter of deadly
struggles, however desirable that might be.
28. See id. art. 8.2.iv; id. art. 8.2.vii (using “unlawful” twice without explanation).
29. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
30. For a brief discussion of the distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello, and the histori-
cal importance of maintaining the distinction, see Alfred P. Rubin, Jus ad Bellum and Jus Cogens: Is
Immorality Illegal?, in HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT CHALLENGES AHEAD; ESSAYS IN
HONOUR OF FRITS KALSHOVEN 595-611 (Astrid I. M. Delissen et al. eds., 1991).
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C. Defendants’ Rights
Now, to return to the problem of the human rights of defendants, a few exam-
ples should explain my doubts.  Suppose a purported villain argues that although
he or she appears to have chaired the state council that ordered a “genocide,” in
fact he or she was vigorously opposed to it and signed the order only when per-
sonally threatened.  Would the council’s minutes be published?  Would the identi-
ty of the threatener be revealed?31  If there is a serious possibility of the publica-
tion of any ruling council’s minutes without the permission of that council, then it
is obvious that ways would be found by the members of the council, in their own
self-protection, to destroy or otherwise render unavailable the true records, if any,
of their deliberations.  Likewise, would Israel expose its inner-council debates that
might exculpate Ariel Sharon from an accusation of complicity in some supposed
atrocity?  Would the Palestinian National Authority if the continued viability of
their unifying leader, Yasir Arafat, were in question?  If so, this would cause intra-
constitutional turmoil which the international community, in the form of a partisan
prosecutor, would not resolve in favor of internal stability.  Is not the removal of a
political leader, even only temporarily and even if found not guilty of whatever the
charges might be, a partisan act in some internal struggle for authority?
Or suppose the situation of a military leader, let us call him hypothetically
General Norman Schwarzkopf, who ordered the bombing of what turned out to
be a civilian bomb-shelter.  His defense might be that he acted on the best infor-
mation available to him that the site was really a military communications post
and that any civilian bomb-shelter that overlay it was an attempt by the enemy to
hide behind “protected persons”32 for military advantage.  Is it really expected that
the intelligence sources, including ground observers in the enemy country or radio
intercepts, be revealed?  Or that the prosecutor could announce the reasons why
he or she is abandoning the case?  And what if the prosecutor decides for what-
ever reason not to abandon the case?  Would a conviction send a deterring mes-
sage?  To whom?  Would any military commander responsible for the lives of his
or her forces and the well-being of his or her community fail to attack a supposed
enemy strong point on the ground that the intelligence might be faulty?  If so, then
all wars would have to end.  That might be a desirable outcome, but perusing the
Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 and Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, I doubt a set of
rules ending recourse to force would be observed in practice by any responsible
statesman or military leader.
31. Rome Statute art. 72.6 (answering no).
32. The 1949 Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
article 13, says that the provisions relating to the general protection of populations against certain conse-
quences of war “cover the whole of the population of the countries in conflict, . . . and are intended to al-
leviate the sufferings caused by war.”  Reprinted IN THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 6, at
506.  But article 28 says: “The presence of a protected person may not be used to render certain points or
areas immune from military operations.”  Id. at 511.  It is not proposed to examine the status of Iraqi civil-
ians during the 1991 Gulf War in any further detail in this place.
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D. The Inherent Imbalances
Then there is the question of the discretion to choose defendants.  While it is
possible to argue that they would be chosen entirely objectively, the evidence nec-
essary to mount an investigation would initially come from victims’ friends or news
media.  Neither is known for impartiality.  The presumption that there would be
equal information on (or against) all sides is not borne out by the facts in the Bal-
kans, Somalia, or any other conflict with which I am familiar.  It is difficult to
imagine equal justice in the scenario where there is evidence sufficient to warrant
further investigation concerning atrocities committed on one side, but not on the
other side.  The presumption seems to be that war or genocide is part of a game
that can be overseen by an umpire with helpers; that “rules” can be imposed or
even voluntarily “accepted” that can be enforced by outsiders interested only in
maintaining the rules of the “game.”  In my opinion, this model of international
society is seriously inaccurate.  When people are willing to kill and die, or send
their children to kill or die, and waste their tax-money and standard of living to kill
or die, and are so short-sighted as to think that “peace” will be possible on a vic-
tor’s terms; where a displaced population would not want to return “home” or
where a loser would agree to itself and its descendants being forever hewers of
wood and drawers of water for a people it identifies as foreign (rightly or
wrongly), the game analogy collapses.
Another problem arises in selecting the villain within a particular side of a con-
flict.  If only selected “leaders” are tried, then the relatives of victims face the pos-
sibility of seeing the murderer of a child walking free in the home community and
the international community advising that nothing can be done.  The converse is
equally daunting—if all the murderers of children are to be tried, then the interna-
tional community is faced with the possibility of having to try and possibly punish
literally hundreds of thousands of villains, be they Hutu, Tutsi, Serbs, Croatians, or
whatever.  On what basis is the prosecutor supposed to decide who gets tried and
who does not?
The Statute of the International Criminal Court seeks to empower the prose-
cutor to make a decision not to pursue a case on the basis of “justice,”33 but it does
not define “justice.”  Since “justice” is a moral term, reasonable people disagree
about it in nearly all cases.  For example, is it “commutative justice” to punish only
the actual perpetrators of a villainous act, or should not those who ordered the act
be punished also?34  If a child is killed, is it commutative justice to punish only the
killer and his or her co-conspirators, or should not their children also be punished
so that the villains feel what their victims (including the surviving relatives of the
dead) feel?  Is it “distributive justice” if property is destroyed in circumstances not
warranted by a clear military advantage, to destroy lots of other innocent property
on the other side?35  Is it “rectificatory” justice if rectification is impossible but only
33. Rome Statute art. 53.2.c.
34. For a definition of “commutative justice,” see 5 ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS ch. 2.
35. For a definition of “distributive justice,” see id. ch. 5.
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payment for death or injury?36  Is payment in cash “justice”?  These questions are
not trivial, and they have been around for about 2,350 years, when Aristotle wrote
about them and denied that “legal justice” can ever be universally agreed.37
Now, these tensions among different conceptions of justice and the felt need of
each municipal criminal law system to do justice sufficiently to satisfy its major
constituencies exist in all legal orders.  It is frequently asserted, then, that these
difficulties with respect to an international criminal court are no greater than are
routinely managed in all municipal systems.  But this analogy seems superficial
and unlikely to survive experience.  In some municipal systems, for example, such
as the criminal justice system in the United States, there are provisions for execu-
tive pardon and other ameliorations, and judges can be impeached, if not other-
wise removed from office, or at least from involvement in particularly sensitive
cases.38  And, embarrassing as it might seem, there are judges whom some attor-
neys avoid.  Moreover, in the current American legal order, except for the rem-
nants of wider authority in a few states, if any, judges fill a role that precludes the
adjudication of common law crimes at least in theory,39 and they fill a role in a
complete legal order in which the weaknesses of their decisions (in the minds of
some members of the order) are part of an overall system that includes lawmaking
and executive functions that are controlled by others.  In extremis, in a legal order
in which no easier amelioration is feasible, there is always the possibility of revolu-
tion—a convulsive change in the entire structure of the legal order.  All of this
would be impossible in the international legal order as currently constructed.
IV
CONCLUSION
We are left with a serious dilemma.  The attempt to create an international
criminal court assumes that in all important ways the international legal order is
similar to the municipal legal orders with which we are familiar.  But with re-
36. For a definition of “rectificatory justice,” see id. ch.2.
37. For example, Aristotle stated:
One part of justice is natural; another is legal [political?] . . . Some hold that the whole of jus-
tice is of this [natural] character.  What exists by nature [they feel] is immutable and has eve-
rywhere the same force: fire burns both in Greece and Persia; but conceptions of justice shift
and change.
Id., reprinted in THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE  365 (Ernest Barker ed., 1975) (1946).
38. These and other reasons are set out at much greater detail in HENRY WHEATON, ENQUIRY INTO
THE VALIDITY OF THE BRITISH CLAIM TO A RIGHT OF VISITATION AND SEARCH OF AMERICAN
VESSELS SUSPECTED TO BE ENGAGED IN THE AFRICAN SLAVE TRADE (1842).  This extraordinary mono-
graph sets out the reasoned objections based on the American Constitution to various British proposals for
an international tribunal to hear cases of the traffic in slaves, which was forbidden by British and American
municipal law of the time and, in the view of many, was forbidden by “international law.”  For a fuller
analysis of the British proposal and why such monist-universalist approaches to criminal law have not
worked in the past and are unlikely to work today, see RUBIN, ETHICS, supra note 1, at 89-91, 125-27, 129-
30, 145-49.
39. As a practical matter, “common law crimes” were ruled out in the federal system in 1816, when
federal prosecuting authorities refused to bring an indictment that would reflect such authority in the judici-
ary.  Justice Joseph Story, in the U.S. Supreme Court, objected in vain.  See United States v. Coolidge, 14
U.S. (1 Wheat.) 415 (1816).
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gard to the criminal law, that assumption is simply not true.  There are at least
two fundamental discrepancies between the international legal order and an
hypothesized “typical” municipal legal order.  First, as to constitutional distri-
butions of authority, there is no universal “law-maker,” “enforcer,” or “adjudi-
cator” in the international legal order.  Attempts to use the techniques of the
positive law—the law of treaties—to create the entire structure of authority
necessary to create a viable criminal law system cannot succeed unless states are
willing to yield some of their most treasured attributes of independence.  Is the
United States willing to have alleged misdeeds of its military and civil leaders,
like General Norman Schwarzkopf or President George Bush, defined by peo-
ple with no interest in the turmoil an arraignment would cause in the American
political system?  Would India or Pakistan with regard to events in Kashmir?
Would Israel or the Palestinian authority?  Would Russia or any Chechen
authority?  Would Turkey, Iran, or Iraq, and any Kurdish authority?  Would
China and any Tibetan or Taiwanese authority?  Would anybody?  As noted in
the discussion of “grave breaches” of the 1949 Geneva Conventions above, it
seems very unlikely.  And if the offenses were satisfactorily defined, would
there be agreement that national defense information be revealed in order to
have a successful prosecution or a successful defense?  General Schwarzkopf’s
hypothesized defense was noted above,40 that he had radio intercept and defec-
tor information that convinced him that a bombshelter in Baghdad had been
deliberately placed above a vital military communications center whose destruc-
tion would save thousands of the lives of his forces.  Under the Rome Statute,
such information need not be revealed, but then what are the chances of a suc-
cessful prosecution of even Slobodan Milosevic?  There is also the problem of
selective information disclosure by governments.  For example, Milosevic’s
government would probably release information showing that most displaced
ethnic Albanians were members of the Kosovo Liberation Army.  We might not
believe that but how many Iraqis (or Arabs generally) would believe our asser-
tions of the innocent motives of General Schwarzkopf?  I forbear to elaborate
on what seems to me an unsolvable series of problems assumed away by propo-
nents of an international criminal law with international enforcement possibili-
ties.
Second, as to the substance of offenses, it has been shown that the current
purported codifications are actually too general or too vague to meet the usual re-
quirements of a criminal justice system administered by fallible and disagreeing
human beings.  For that reason, enforcement of criminal law has been left to the
national courts, where the accused knows the system and national approaches can
be fully accommodated.  However, we have not even begun to speak of differing
approaches to the nature of criminal law itself.  The notion that Western Euro-
pean and American definitions of the needs of society represent the global con-
science of mankind ignores the clear cultural divides.  Many cultures disagree with
us.  Divine law systems in the Islamic world are not minor aberrations despite our
40. See text accompanying note 32.
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unhappiness with the Salman Rushdie Fatwa.  The Chinese notion that stability,
security, and centralized authority are essential to social welfare is not absurd
given a society with the population-to-resources ratio and history of mainland
China.  Again, I forbear to elaborate on what seems an obvious theme.
This essay merely scratches the surface.  The problem is not subject to resolu-
tion by tinkering with details; the ingenuity of even those who are most widely
seen as villains is just as great as the ingenuity of us who wear only white hats.
